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Despite the manner of their election, Police and Crime
Commissioners are bringing about a significant change in the
governance of the police
The Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) elections in November 2012 marked a historic change in the
democratic accountability of police services in England and Wales. Barry Loveday considers why public
enthusiasm for the elections was so low, and goes on to assess the early performance of PCCs in office.
 Despite their limited electoral mandates, he finds, a number of PCCs have been forceful in using the range of
powers at their disposal.
With the
Police
Ref orm and
Social
Responsibility Act of  2011 and the election of  Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) the Coalit ion
government introduced a f undamental change to the structure of  police governance as previously
established under the 1964 Police Act. The Act also represented perhaps one of  the most radical shif ts in
Conservative Party policy towards the police, challenging the party’s tradit ional stance as both highly
supportive and protective of  the police service.
Mishaps and misjudgements: the PCC elections
Given its apparent prominence within the Conservative- led Coalit ion’s policy agenda, the implementation of
the 2011 legislation got of f  to a surprisingly shaky start. Several key decisions ahead of  the elections did
nothing to erase this perception.  First, the decision that the election of  PCCs should be a stand-alone
election to be held in November 2012 created an immediate risk of  a low turnout among voters. Next was
the government’s f ailure to provide any details of  the candidates standing f or the election. A view within the
Home Of f ice that the PCC elections did not justif y the expense of  a direct mail-out to voters about the
candidates, and that inf ormation would be provided to the public by way of  an election website, did litt le to
enhance the process. If  this was not bad enough, Nick Herbert, the Minister f or Police Ref orm and leading
proponent of  directly-elected PCCs, was to suddenly and quite unexpectedly resign f rom his post just prior
to the election, f ollowing a Government reshuf f le in which he f ailed to win a promotion.
Not surprisingly, the end result of  this succession of  mishaps and misjudgements was an election which
saw the lowest turnout in peacetime history with only 15% of  the electorate voting, f ar worse than the 24%
turnout achieved in the European elections of  1999. It was evident that many potential electors did not f eel
suf f iciently knowledgeable about the candidates to make any judgement concerning them. In the event the
victorious PCC candidates were elected with an average mandate of  just 7% among those eligible to vote.
Of  perhaps greater concern was the number of  spoilt ballot papers in the PCC elections. Spoilt ballot
papers ran between 2.5% and 4.5% of  the total turnout. In Coventry, the number of  spoilt ballot papers
outnumbered the votes cast f or one of  the main party candidates. It appeared that despite Home Of f ice
claims to the contrary, the public did not wish to be ‘empowered’.
The two main polit ical parties won the majority of  PCC elections with the Conservatives gaining 16 and
Labour 13 PCC posts. Yet the interesting f eature of  the election was to be the unexpected success of
independent candidates who were to win 11 PCC posts. Independent candidates were to benef it f rom the
f ailure to coordinate the PCC election with local government elections and arguably also f rom a perception
among the f ew that did bother to vote that party polit ics should not intrude on the work of  the police
service.
Early signs of change in police governance
The decisions taken by a number of  PCCs post-election in relation to appointing deputy commissioners
and support staf f  did litt le init ially to heighten their public esteem. No f ewer than 16 PCCs have to date
appointed deputies at salaries of  up to £65,000. In West Mercia, f or example, the independent PCC was to
appoint his own campaign manager as his deputy, whom like the PCC had recently retired f rom
Staf f ordshire police where they were both operational police of f icers. Described within the media as being
clear evidence of  cronyism, these appointments may be seen to have been, in some cases, ill- judged. Yet it
is also evident that currently the popular press appear to be deliberately amplif ying any ‘improper ’ expenses
incurred by PCCs when these are subject to challenge. Since their election it would appear that f or the
press PCCs are seen as a kind of  legit imate target through which they can channel public opprobrium.
The f irst indication that signif icant change was underway within police governance was the early decision
taken by the PCC f or Avon and Somerset in November 2012 not to automatically rubber stamp an extension
of  the then chief  constable’s contract. He was instead inf ormed that he would be required to reapply f or his
post. A subsequent appeal to the courts by the chief  constable upheld the decision of  the PCC. This
represented an event almost unparalleled in regional police governance and clearly demonstrated that
within the 2011 Act the power posit ion of  the chief  constable, previously unassailable, was now at risk. It
appears that the role of  the PCC in relation to the chief  constable is very clearly one of  principal to agent,
where the chief  constable is now made directly accountable to the PCC. This is a role reversal f rom
previous governance arrangements, where the chief  constable was de facto principals and the f ormer police
authority lit t le more than that of f icer ’s agent.
This highly interesting change in relationship was to be f urther highlighted by events in Gwent police f orce.
Here the PCC, an independent and f ormer President of  the Police Superintendents Association, was to
require the chief  constable to either retire or be removed. This f ollowed on f rom what was claimed to be
the open hostility of  the chief  constable to the PCC role which the PCC stated had ”frustrated his ability to
exercise those responsibilities that the people of Gwent had entrusted to him” . The chief  constable Carmel
Napier did not seek to challenge the PCC’s posit ion, and resigned soon af ter receiving the ult imatum.
Appearing later bef ore the Home Af f airs Committee the f ormer chief  constable was to claim that she was
subject to bullying f rom the PCC and that in her opinion it was against all sense of  justice f or one individual
to have “so much unfettered power.” The irony of  the situation is that the same point has been made quite
regularly about the authority of  chief  constables in the past.
It is as yet too early to predict how the PCC experiment will develop in the f uture. It seems that some PCCs
will be more pro-active than others in developing their role. It is of  interest that despite the events leading
to the demise of  two chief  constables the Home Of f ice continues to demonstrate a ‘hands-of f ’ approach
to local police governance. Chief  of f icers can no longer assume that the automatic protection extended by
successive Home Secretaries will now be on of f er. This in itself  represents a major change and may only
serve to reinf orce both the localism agenda pursued by the Coalit ion and the f uture power posit ion of
Police and Crime Commissioners.
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